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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
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Frustration with the performance of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) has led to two rounds of reform: the 
first round, from the 1960s through the 1980s, attempted 
to improve SOE performance while maintaining public 
ownership while the second, beginning in the late 1980s, 
viewed privatization as the answer. Interest in the earlier 
round of reform has increased recently as controversy 
has slowed or halted privatization in many countries, 
especially for SOEs providing infrastructure services 
that are basic to everyday life and are thought to have 
elements of monopoly. This paper reexamines the earlier 
This paper— product of the Sustainable Development Network—is part of a larger effort to renew our knowledge of how 
to improve the performance of infrastructure service providers, when full privatization is out of the realm of possibilities.   
The work program of SDN builds upon this framework, applying it at a sectoral and regional level and extending it to 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). It aims at identifying the specific conditions under which each type of infrastructure 
reform can be expected to work, so better guidance can be provided to operational teams and clients. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jose_gomez-
ibanez@harvard.edu.
round of reforms, focusing particularly on efforts to 
increase the firms’ capacity with infusions of human 
and physical capital, to strengthen managerial incentives 
through performance contracts and corporatization and 
to alter the mix of political and economic forces that 
impinge on the firm by strengthening the involvement 
of taxpayers, customers or private investors. The review 
suggests that these earlier approaches generated only 
modest success but that some of them, selectively 
applied, may be helpful in improving the performance of 
infrastructure firms that remain in public hands. 
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  ii(1) APPROACHES TO REFORM 
 
The Rise and Reform of SOEs 
The number and importance of state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, increased 
rapidly in most developing and many industrialized countries in the two or three decades 
after World War II.  The motives for turning to public ownership varied.  Socialism had a 
strong appeal in many countries at the time, in part because capitalism seemed to have 
failed in the worldwide depression of the 1930s while fascism had been discredited by the 
war.  Concern about private monopoly was also strong, particularly for utility and 
infrastructure services and in small countries.  In developing countries local private 
capital markets seemed too weak and local entrepreneurs too inexperienced to make the 
large and risky investments in industry and infrastructure thought needed for 
development.  And there was an understandable reluctance to trust such sensitive 
investments to foreigners, especially in nations which had only recently won their 
independence from colonial rule.  Public enterprises offered an attractive option that 
promised to combine business-like efficiency with social responsibility. 
Concern about SOE performance developed fairly quickly, provoking two rounds 
of reform.  The first round, which started in the 1960s and reached its peak in the 1970s 
and 1980s, attempted to improve the firms’ performance while maintaining public 
ownership.  Disappointment with these efforts helped provoke a second round of reform, 
beginning in the 1980s and peaking in the 1990s, that sought to improve performance by 
selling or leasing the firms to private investors.  This second round was more successful 
than the first.  Many companies were privatized, typically to the benefit of both taxpayers 
(in reduced financial support for the enterprise) and customers (in lower prices or 
improved quality of service).  In a number of well-publicized cases, however, the benefits 
from privatization seemed small or very unequally distributed, often with investors or 
taxpayers gaining excessively at the expense of customers or workers (Estache, 2006).  
The resulting controversies slowed or halted privatization in many countries, leaving a 
considerable number of firms still in government hands. 
The slowdown in privatization has renewed interest in the experience with the 
first round of SOE reforms to see if there are promising measures, short of privatization, 
  1to improve the performance of the remaining SOEs.  The primary focus here is on firms 
offering infrastructure or utility services in developing countries since they share two 
characteristics that make them among the hardest to privatize.  First, the services they 
provide, such as water or electricity, are so essential to everyday modern life that the 
tariffs charged and the quality of service provided are politically sensitive issues.   
Second, many infrastructure services are thought to have the characteristics of natural 
monopoly, which usually compels governments to regulate the tariffs that private 
providers charge in order to protect customers from monopoly abuse.  It has sometimes 
proven difficult to design systems of tariff regulation that both customers and investors 
regard as fair, particularly in countries where citizens and investors have little confidence 
in the integrity of their government or the legal system.  Some of the remaining 
infrastructure and utility SOEs will be privatized eventually, despite the obstacles.  But 
many are likely to remain in public hands for a long time, and it is worth considering how 
their performance might be improved. 
 
The Goals of Reform 
The prospects for any reform depend in part on its goals.  The usual objective of 
SOE reform is to encourage the firms to behave in a more “business-like” manner, 
emphasizing commercial goals rather than what are often called non-commercial, social 
or political goals (McFetridge, 1985; World Bank 1994).  Commercial goals include 
providing quality services that consumers value and producing those services efficiently 
so that costs can be recovered at reasonably affordable prices.  A common non-
commercial goal for infrastructure SOEs is to promote universal access by, if necessary, 
charging tariffs well below costs and extending service into unprofitable territories.   
Other non-commercial goals include reducing unemployment by hiring more workers 
than are needed or by locating plants in lagging regions, supporting suppliers by paying 
more than the market rate for labor or other inputs, and stabilizing the macro-economy by 
restraining price increases during recessions or periods of inflation. 
Many reformers argue that an SOE can pursue both commercial and non-
commercial goals efficiently if it clearly distinguishes the two types of activities and 
separates, to the extent practical, their costs.  A common suggestion is that the 
  2government specify the non-commercial activities, often called “public service 
obligations,” that it wants the enterprise to engage in and provide budgetary support 
sufficient to cover the losses incurred.  The SOE would then be free to engage in 
commercial activities as long as it could fund those activities from customer tariffs.   
Privatization proponents argue that this separation should be taken two steps further by 
hiving off the SOE’s commercial activities as a separate private firm and then 
encouraging the SOE to contract for the remaining non-commercial services with private 
vendors. 
But the separation of commercial and non-commercial activities does not resolve 
the conflict between commercial and non-commercial goals.  The subsidies to support 
public service obligations must ultimately be financed through some kind of tax on 
commercial activities.  Separation only makes the tax more obvious by converting it from 
a hidden cross subsidy within the SOE to an explicit transfer from the treasury to the 
SOE.  And efforts to reduce the financial burden of non-commercial activities by out-
sourcing to private venders can be a mixed blessing if the economies come at the expense 
of other common social objectives of SOEs, such as creating jobs by overstaffing. 
The impetus for reform is typically the fear that the public enterprises have 
neglected commercial goals to the point that they are jeopardizing society’s ability to 
advance important non-commercial goals.  The public enterprises may charge such low 
tariffs or be so overstaffed, for example, that they no longer have the resources to offer 
reliable service or to extend service to new neighborhoods.  Or the deficits of the 
enterprises may impose a burden on the treasury so great that they crowd out social 
spending or cause inflation.  In this context, commercial objectives usually trump non-
commercial objectives, at least initially, although non-commercial concerns usually 
reappear after a time. 
 
Three Approaches to Reform 
Three approaches to reform are considered here, each reflecting a different 
diagnosis of the root causes of poor SOE performance.  The diagnoses are not mutually 
exclusive, however, and the different approaches are often pursued in combination. 
  3The first strategy, which dominated the efforts to improve SOE performance from 
the 1950s through the 1970s, assumes that the firms lack the physical and human capacity 
to perform well.  The solution is to build the internal capacity of the firm through 
injections of physical capital, in the form of modern plant and equipment, and human 
capital, in the form of technical assistance and training.  The focus in this review is on the 
experience with human capital, and particularly with training and assistance for middle 
and upper level management. 
The second approach, which came into vogue during the 1970s and 1980s, 
emphasizes managerial incentives rather than capacity.  The assumption is that SOEs 
perform poorly because the managers are not held accountable for a clear set of goals and 
not given autonomy they need to achieve them.  The problem of managerial incentives is 
less serious in the private than the public sector because private sector managers are 
responsible to one master, the shareholders, and the shareholders in turn care primarily 
about profits, which provide a fairly clear yardstick for judging management 
performance.  The public sector manager, by contrast, is responsible, formally or 
informally, to the head of the executive branch of government, to the legislature that 
establishes his agency’s powers and approves its budget, and to the various interest 
groups that seek to influence the agency’s performance.  Moreover, each of these 
constituencies is typically interested in a variety of objectives that are often hard to 
measure and conflicting, so that even a well-intentioned and informed manager may not 
know what to do.
1  The solution implied is for the government officials and the managers 
to agree on the key targets that the firm is to achieve and for the officials to commit, in 
return, not to intervene in the day-to-day management of the firm.  The agreement is 
often set out in a formal document called a performance contract.  The firm’s autonomy 
and accountability is usually reinforced by establishing it as a separate legal entity—
either a corporation or a statutory authority—and sometimes by creating a special 
supervisory agency to serve as a buffer between the firm and conflicting political forces. 
                                                 
1 Robert Behn (2003, p. 599) and others have pointed out that this difference between the private and public 
sectors is a bit exaggerated.  The traditional “bottom line” measure of performance used by the private 
sector is often criticized for being backward looking and for ignoring long-term value-creating activities, 
such as investment in customer relations or innovation 
  4The third approach, which has been tried sporadically over the years, argues that 
the problem is less that the managers lack clear instructions than that there is little 
support for commercial goals among the important constituencies of the firm.  The 
assumption is that the behavior of the firm reflects the balance of political and economic 
interests bearing on it so that if public enterprises fail to pursue commercial objectives it 
is because there are few powerful interests pressing them to do so.  In developing 
countries, public enterprises often constitute unusually large aggregations of resources 
that make them tempting targets for interest groups, and a performance contract or a 
buffering agency does little to change that equation.  Privatization induces commercial 
behavior, in this view, because it creates a new interest group—the private 
shareholders—who have a strong interest in such behavior and the potential to fire 
managers and vote against politicians who try to thwart them.  What is needed, then, is a 
way to reorganize the SOE that mobilizes and empowers interest groups who have a stake 
in commercial behavior while still maintaining public ownership or control.  The most 
obvious allies are taxpayers, customers and private investors.  For example, customers 
might be given more influence by providing better information on firm performance or 
by reorganizing the firm as a cooperative or other consumer-governed organization.   
Similarly, investors might be given influence by selling them some of the SOE’s debt or a 
minority interest in its equity. 
Although the focus is on public enterprise reforms other than privatization, the 
distinction is sometimes a bit arbitrary.   In this study private investment in a firm is not 
considered privatization as long as the public sector retains majority control of the 
enterprise.  However the contracting out of services is considered privatization, and not 
discussed here, even though a publicly owned enterprise may be supervising the 
contractor.  Contracting out is a promising approach, but including it would greatly 
enlarge the scope of this study. 
Unfortunately, there is less research on the alternatives to privatization than on 
privatization.  Privatization is typically a more clearly defined act, and thus lends its self 
more readily to quantitative empirical analysis.  Moreover, many of the studies of public 
enterprise reform involve firms in industrialized countries or in competitive markets 
when our concern here is with firms in developing countries that are often natural 
  5monopolies.  Research from developed countries and competitive industries is presented 
here, especially when there is no better, but the results must be applied with caution.  The 
experiences with the individual reform strategies are summarized in the three sections of 
the report that follow, but some broad conclusions about the prospects are summarized 
below. 
 
The Prospects for Reform 
The controversies surrounding privatization lead many to assume that alternative 
approaches will be easier or more readily accepted.  But the truth is that the challenges 
facing the alternatives are similar to, and in some respects harder than, those facing 
privatization.  One reason is that they share a common goal of promoting more 
commercial behavior.  In cases where privatization has been controversial because 
commercial goals conflict with strongly held social goals, the alternative reforms risk 
igniting the same controversies.  And it may be politically less acceptable for a 
government firm to take socially painful actions—such as raising tariffs or laying off 
surplus workers—than it is for a private firm. 
Another similarity is that both privatization and its alternatives are constrained by 
the quality of local institutions and the state of the local economy.  Some types of reform 
are more dependent on sophisticated markets and institutions than others, so that the 
possibilities for reform vary from one country to the next.  But both privatization and its 
alternatives depend on institutions and markets to some degree.  And SOE reforms alone 
are unlikely to overcome intense poverty, poor budgeting, weak courts, limited capital 
markets and other deep-rooted and basic problems with a country’s economy or 
institutions. 
These problems are compounded by the fact that privatization has already 
skimmed the cream of the public enterprises that were candidates for reform.  Most of the 
SOEs that were potentially profitable, that operate in competitive markets or are easily 
regulated have long since been privatized.  The public firms that remain are often 
infrastructure or utility monopolies operating in environments where it has been difficult 
to devise a fair and politically acceptable scheme for tariff regulation.  The characteristics 
  6of monopoly and social sensitivity that made these firms difficult to privatize are likely to 
impede alternative reforms as well. 
Finally, if more commercial behavior is the main or an important goal, then the 
alternative approaches are relatively indirect instruments compared to privatization.  The 
economics literature is full of theoretical and empirical studies debating whether private 
firms are more economically efficient than public firms (Shirley and Walsh, 2000).  But it 
is clear that private owners have a strong incentive to pursue commercial behavior 
because they can retain any extra profit they can squeeze out of the enterprise.  And 
private owners have share prices, stock options and other means to monitor and motivate 
the performance of their managers that are not available to government owners.  Private 
managers also must worry that their poor performance can stimulate a corporate takeover 
or bankruptcy, risks that are more remote for an SOE.  The alternatives to privatization 
often amount to cumbersome efforts to establish similar information and incentives, but 
without the aid of profit motives and markets. 
Despite these warnings, alternative reform strategies have important potential, 
particularly if they are applied selectively and with reasonable expectations.  The 
impression that SOE reform failed in the past stems in part from the fact that some reform 
strategies—such as capacity building and performance contracts—were applied relatively 
widely and indiscriminately.  We don’t know enough to specify exactly when and where 
each approach might work because the available research and evidence is simply too 
limited.  But we have some important hints about the circumstances favoring different 
kinds of reform 
The basic step is to classify the firms by the degree of conflict between 
commercial and non-commercial goals and the level of development of the market and 
administrative institutions of the country.  Where the level of conflict is low, one may be 
able to rely on strategies that increase the firm’s internal capacity or clarify the 
responsibilities of managers and ministers instead of strategies that attempt the more 
difficult task of altering the political environment of the firm.  And where the 
development of institutions is advanced, one may be able to use measures that rely more 
heavily on institutional capabilities, such as explicit performance contracts and mixed-
capital enterprises. 
  7(2) BUILDING INTERNAL CAPACITY 
 
The Expansion of Training and Technical Assistance 
When management training and assistance to developing countries began in the 
1950s it was addressed to the public sector as a whole, with little attention to the special 
needs of SOEs.  Countries in Africa and Asia were beginning to win independence and 
wanted to indigenize their public administrations, and the big increase in SOEs was still a 
decade away.  There was great faith that the transfer of knowledge and skills would 
stimulate development and that the primary obstacles to development were administrative 
rather than economic (Stone, 1965, p. 53 as cited by Siffin, 1976).  Indeed the importance 
that development specialists placed on administration in the 1950s and 1960s is an 
interesting forerunner to the preoccupation of development experts with institutions and 
governance today. 
As part of this effort, the USAID, the United Nations and the Ford Foundation 
supported the establishment institutes or schools of public administration in dozens of 
countries, spending collectively $280 million on the effort between 1951 and 1962, the 
equivalent of several billions in today’s dollars.  During this same period the French 
government helped its former colonies in Africa and Southeast Asia to establish local 
versions of France’s elite civil service university, the L’Ecole Nationale d’Administration 
(ENA).  By the last half of the 1960s USAID and the Ford Foundation had become 
discouraged and cut back their activity.  The United Nations and France continued to 
support the effort, however, and by 1980 there were at least 236 institutes and schools of 
public administration in 91 countries.  In addition, OECD countries provided substantial 
numbers of overseas training fellowships in public administration: 14,000 in 1978 alone 
(Paul, 1983, pp. 18-21). 
Specialized programs aimed at the needs of SOE managers began to appear in the 
1960s.  Among the best known were those developed by three business schools founded 
that decade with the help and advice of prestigious US business schools:  the Indian 
Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, the Central American Institute of Business 
Administration in Nicaragua (now in Costa Rica), and the Asian Institute of Management 
in Manila.  All three schools had been established to cater to private sector managers but 
  8soon offered a modified curriculum for managers of public enterprises (Stifel et al., 1977, 
pp. 95-96; Chowdhry, 1977; Paul, 1983, p. 46).  In 1974 the International Center for 
Public Enterprises in Developing Countries was established at the University of 
Ljubljana, Yugoslavia (now Slovenia).  That center, supported by the United Nations, 
became the first international institution devoted to SOE management training and 
research.  At its peak it counted over forty countries as contributing members, published 
monographs and a journal, Public Enterprise, and trained hundreds of managers a year at 
Ljubljana or on site in member countries.  In 1977, Harvard University’s Institute for 
International Development began to offer executive programs in comparative SOE 
management that were also influential. 
During this period, the World Bank supported some training for public sector 
managers through both the technical assistance component of project loans and its 
Economic Development Institute (EDI).  Spending on project-related training was 
substantial, rising from $38 million in 1976 to $187 million in 1981 (Paul, 1983, p. 1), 
although much of this was presumably for technical rather than management training.  
Unfortunately project-related training was often based on narrow and short-term 
requirements rather than on an assessment of the overall training needs of the enterprise 
and the quality of the programs varied greatly depending upon the priorities of the project 
task managers, both problems that remain today (World Bank, 1982 and 2005).  The 
training courses that EDI offered itself were on development economics and project 
appraisal, topics which were chosen with economic policymakers in mind but which, 
though relevant to SOE managers, were too narrow to meet their needs.  EDI’s Industry, 
Finance and Energy Division sponsored some off-site training, but its main training-like 
activity was to organize workshops to bring together government officials and managers 
to discuss the problems of SOE performance.  A common objective from the late 1970s 
through much of the 1980s was to encourage officials to divest commercial activities, 
such as hotels, in which there was no obvious reason for the government to be involved. 
 
Problems 
Training programs are notoriously hard to evaluate, so it is no surprise that there 
is little hard evidence about the impact of the new institutes of public administration or 
  9the specialized programs in SOE management.  It is easy to test whether participants have 
learned the skills taught and to ask whether those skills seem relevant to their jobs.  But it 
is much harder to determine whether the training changed the decisions the participants 
make or the performance of their enterprises.  Nevertheless, most observers thought the 
programs suffered from several serious problems. 
The most fundamental problem was uncertainty about what to teach.  Many of the 
new institutes were modeled after US schools of public administration, which were then 
in the midst of an important debate about the roles of civil servants in a democracy.  The 
prevailing view before World War II, when many of the US schools were founded, was 
that elected politicians determined policy and civil servants implemented their decisions; 
hence the new field was christened public administration.  But scholarship in the 1940s 
and 1950s revealed what practitioners always knew: that civil servants exercised 
substantial discretion if only because politicians didn’t have the time and expertise to 
develop detailed policy directives, or didn’t want the political risks of doing so.   
Moreover, many senior civil servants were themselves political entrepreneurs in that they 
often worked discretely with interest groups and politicians to insure that their agencies 
had the political mandate to undertake activities the civil servants felt worthwhile.  This 
shifting understanding of the role of government officials would lead US schools in the 
1960s and 1970s to use the terms public management and public policy as well public 
administration in describing their field (Hood, 2005; Lynn, 2005). 
Only parts of the curricula from US schools of public administration were thought 
transferable to developing countries (Stifel et al., 1977; Siffin, 1976).  The most 
transferable were the more technical tools of administration such as budgeting, 
accounting, information and personnel systems.  Also transferable to some extent were 
the methods used by managers to analyze their agency’s environment, which drew 
heavily from economics, politics and sociology.  Less transferable were American 
perspectives on how organizations should be structured, which had been dominated until 
that time by a somewhat mechanistic perspective, preoccupied by such questions as the 
optimal number of subordinates that should report to one manager.  And hardest to 
transfer were culture-bound norms about individual and group responsibilities in 
decision-making or about the relationships between civil servants and politicians, 
  10especially for countries that were new to democracy or had one-party or authoritarian 
rule. 
The typical solution was to focus on the more technical subjects, but this ran the 
risk that the tools learned seemed irrelevant and that important issues were not being 
taught.  What point was there in making the financial accounts all neat and tidy, one 
observer worried, if doing so had little effect on irresponsible financial policies (Siffin 
1976)?  The most important problems facing senior managers seldom revolved around 
administrative tools but rather around managing the relationship between their 
organization and its political environment and determining, in that context, the most 
socially worthwhile services that the organization could provide. 
The issue of what to teach was even more troubling in the programs specially 
designed for SOE managers.  One frustrated SOE training expert complained that public 
enterprise managers suffered from being “bipolar…where they find themselves akin to 
public administrators in their accountability and goals on the one hand yet expected to 
function freely as a business manager” (Bhaya, 1983, p. 17).  Some of the training 
courses seemed to emphasize one pole and give only lip service to the other: adding a 
class on marketing to a standard curriculum for civil servants, for example, or a class on 
the theoretical justifications for public enterprises to a standard curriculum for private 
business managers.
2  Moreover, while institutes like the International Center for Public 
Enterprises struggled mightily to find teachable solutions to the problems faced by SOE 
managers—unclear and conflicting goals, frequent interventions by politicians, an overly 
bureaucratic culture, etc.—few seemed forthcoming.  Instead, there was a certain amount 
of faddishness, with national governments often promoting their homegrown remedies 
for SOE malaise.  For a while the Yugoslav government promoted its idea of workers’ 
self-management, later the French advanced their scheme of contract plans, the Italians 
pushed for holding companies as a buffer between SOEs and politicians while the 
Japanese, in the years when their auto and electronics industries were conquering the 
world, tried to convince SOE specialists that quality circles and just-in-time management 
were the solution. 
                                                 
2 For example see the course outlines at Khan et al. (1982, pp. 72, 135 and 161). 
  11Another problem, besides the content, was that few public agencies and SOEs had 
well-thought-out training polices (Paul, 1983).  SOEs typically did not assess their 
training needs or develop programs to systematically deliver appropriate training at key 
points in the course of their employees’ careers.  Particularly with overseas training, 
participants were often selected as a reward for loyalty or favors rather than because they 
were being groomed to fill key posts in the enterprise.  Training seldom featured in 
promotion or pay decisions and senior managers often had little training, which further 
undermined trainee incentives. 
Finally, the new public administration institutions often proved to be weak.  Many 
institutions failed to recruit a staff of sufficient quality and quantity to gain the attention 
and respect of the government.  As a result, the institutions often focused exclusively on 
training, without the research and consultancy activities that were critical to inform 
teaching in this new and evolving field.  The business schools which provided public 
management and enterprise training seemed to fare better, possibly because their base in 
private management training helped them build a critical mass of faculty and maintain 
some autonomy from government (Chowdhry, 1977; Stifel et al., 1977, pp. 95-100).  It 
may have also helped that there was a stronger consensus about the topics private 
managers should learn, and that these schools were often regional in character and thus 
not dependent on intake from one country.  But a broad base of countries did not save the 
International Center for Public Enterprises in Ljubljana, which remained dependent on 




Although the record of the 1950s through the 1980s is fairly discouraging, the 
basic premise—that training is needed—seems sound.  If the best-run private businesses 
find it useful to send their managers to training programs, then it is hard to imagine that 
public enterprises would not benefit from doing so as well.  Our understanding of what 
should be taught also has improved in certain respects; in particular, there is a greater 
willingness to talk candidly and constructively about the relationship between 
management and politics, although this remains much more true for democratic than 
  12authoritarian regimes.  We are still far away, however, from understanding how the 
performance of different types of government enterprises is affected by the firm’s design 
and the political, social, institutional and economic environments in which it operates.  
Thus any manager expecting to learn the optimal design of a public enterprise for a 
particular industry and country is bound to be a bit disappointed. 
Arguably the key to making sure future training is worthwhile is that it is offered 
only after a systematic assessment of the firm’s needs and as part of a coherent and 
integrated personnel development program.  Also important is the use of training 
institutions that have the intellectual breadth to address the most sensitive aspects of SOE 
life as well as to teach tools.  Even meeting these conditions, however, training alone is 
unlikely to turn around a weak enterprise or solve the problem of political pressure for 
non-commercial goals.  
  13(3) CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
Managerial Accountability and Autonomy 
A popular strategy for improving SOE performance during the 1980s was to 
clarify the responsibilities of the SOE and its government owners.  The idea was that it is 
difficult to hold SOE managers accountable for performance because the firm is typically 
assigned multiple and conflicting goals.  And the lack of accountability gave politicians 
and government officials an obligation or excuse to intervene in the firm’s day-to-day 
affairs.  Officials and managers should agree on the key goals that the managers are to 
account for and the officials should then give the managers autonomy to pursue those 
goals.  Accountability and autonomy are consistent with one another since managers 
cannot be held accountable unless they also enjoy some autonomy. 
The understanding between the officials and the managers took a variety of forms, 
specified at different levels of detail.  In some cases it is captured in the SOE’s 
authorizing statute or articles of incorporation which might, for example, detail the types 
of services the firm is to offer, the sources of funds it can raise and the returns it is 
expected to earn on its investments.  In other cases the understanding was written into 
regulations that applied to all government-owned corporations.  But the most popular 
form during the 1980s was an explicit contract negotiated between the firm’s managers 
and its supervising agency. 
Countries used different names for these contracts including contract plans, 
memoranda of understanding, statements of corporate intent and performance 
agreements.  The generic term is performance contracts, however, since their essential 
feature is that they specify the measures by which the firm’s performance will be judged.  
Most contracts also included commitments by the government to provide budgetary 
support for any unprofitable services the government required and to allow timely price 
increases.  In some cases the contracts also established specific incentives for managers 
or workers, such as bonuses linked to the firm’s performance.  Even without explicit 
incentives there was always the implicit threat that the board or the management would 
be sacked if it did not meet the targets. 
  14The performance contract was frequently accompanied by various institutional 
reforms, often loosely referred to as corporatization, that were designed to strengthen the 
autonomy and accountability of the enterprise.  Sometimes the firm was incorporated 
under the same laws as a private company, with the main difference being that the 
government was the only or controlling shareholder.  Alternatively the enterprise might 
be established as a separate statutory authority or government company, with a legal 
identity distinct from its supervising ministry and its own board of directors.  The distinct 
legal identity typically forced the government to separate the financial accounts of the 
enterprise from those of the ministry, an essential first step in accountability.  And 
incorporation usually required that the firm release public annual accounts certified by an 
external auditor.  The government corporation or statutory authority was typically exempt 
from civil service rules and other government procurement or personnel policies. 
Sometimes a specialized supervisory agency was established to buffer the SOE 
from political forces.  The power to appoint the board of directors and exercise other 
shareholder rights was often moved from the technical ministry in charge of the sector to 
a body more sympathetic to commercial objectives, such as a separate public enterprise 
unit or holding company reporting to the ministry of finance.  The separation of the 
government’s ownership and policy-making functions was intended to reduce conflicts of 
interest so that, for example, the enterprise could better resist pressures from the technical 
ministry to offer unprofitable services without budgetary compensation.  A special 
supervisory agency also allowed the government to better utilize scarce managerial talent, 
especially if the agency supervised several enterprises rather than one.  The staff was 
often composed of elite professionals paid higher salaries than normal civil servants so 
that they were better able to deal with the powerful heads of SOEs, and their number was 
kept small to discourage unnecessary meddling. 
 
The Evolution of the Schemes 
Interest in performance contracts and related methods of clarifying 
responsibilities waxed and waned during the last half century.  Performance contracting 
originated in France in the late 1960s, and spread to countries in Francophone Africa in 
1980, Pakistan and Korea in 1983, China in 1986, India in 1988 and, by the end of the 
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countries as well (Nellis, 1989; Trivedi, 1990).  Most countries applied the scheme to 
traditional infrastructure companies, such as railways and electricity, but some countries, 
including Korea, Pakistan and China, applied it to government-owned manufacturing 
firms as well (Mako and Zhang, 2004).  The World Bank and other donors encouraged 
the spread of performance contracting by often making it a prerequisite for SOE aid, 
particularly in Africa and Latin America.  Interest in performance contracting died out in 
developing countries during the 1990s as attention turned to privatization as a remedy. 
Developed countries experienced a similar but less exaggerated spike in interest 
in performance contracting.  Spain adopted a form of performance contracting soon after 
France, for example, while Britain promulgated standards for SOE performance in a 
series of white papers during the 1960s and 1970s (Harrison, 1988).  The best known and 
most enthusiastic convert among the industrialized countries was New Zealand, which 
corporatized more than a dozen government departments beginning in 1986, privatized 
some in the 1990s, and developed a very systematic and carefully thought out version of 
performance contracting for those that remained in public hands.  Although government-
wide programs of performance contracting have become rare, public administration 
scholars and practiconers in developed countries continue to advocate and experiment 
with schemes of performance measurement to motivate managers (Behn 2001). 
Two new variants of the earlier proposals to clarify SOE responsibilities emerged 
in developing countries at the turn of the century after the controversies over privatization 
had revived interest in SOE reform.  One variant is to subject government-owned utilities 
to the kind of tariff regulation normally used to prevent monopoly abuse by private 
utilities.  The idea is that the regulatory agency will play the role of an elite supervisory 
agency, arbitrating between the ministry that owns the enterprises and the managers and 
customers.  This approach was pioneered by Chile, which corporatized its publicly owned 
water companies and regulated them as if they were private monopolies beginning in 
1989 as the first steps toward their eventual privatization.
3  Controversy delayed 
privatization for another decade but the companies’ performance improved significantly 
                                                 
3 The Chilean system of utility regulation is unusual in that the procedures the regulatory agency must use 
are set out in law at a level of detail similar to a performance contract (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003, pp. 354-355). 
  16in the interim (Shirley et al., 2002).  Chile’s experience helped inspire the regulation of 
government-owned utilities in as much as a quarter of Latin America
4 as well as 
Australia, Northern Ireland, Scotland and South Africa. 
The second recent variant is to develop codes of corporate governance for SOEs 
modeled after the codes promulgated for private corporations.  South Africa, India, 
Indonesia, China and Bangladesh all adopted codes between 2001 and 2005 and the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued a model code 
in 2005 (Robinett, 2006, p. 7).  The OECD code is intended primarily for SOEs involved 
in commercial activities and thus a major concern is insuring a “level playing field” in 
markets where SOEs and private enterprises compete.  Toward that end the code 
recommends separating the government ownership function from sector regulation, 
allowing SOEs to be placed into bankruptcy and insuring that credit from state-owned 
banks is provided on commercial terms.  But the code also calls for the state to act as an 
“informed and active owner” by establishing clear objectives for state ownership, 
pursuing these objectives in a transparent and accountable manner, allowing the 
management operational autonomy to achieve their defined objectives and respecting the 
role and independence of the SOE board (OECD, 2005).  The OECD falls short of calling 
for an explicit performance contract, but the intent seems very similar. 
 
Performance Contracts 
Evaluations of Contracting.  The most studied scheme for clarifying 
responsibilities is performance contracting.  Early evaluations focused on whether the 
SOEs met their targets and whether the government officials and enterprise managers 
found the process useful.  These studies were often short on quantitative evidence but 
rich with case histories that generated important insights about the problems encountered 
(Nellis, 1989; Shirley and Nellis, 1991).  As more data became available, researchers 
began to address the question of whether SOE performance had improved over what it 
would have been otherwise.  Comparing a cross section of firms with and without 
                                                 
4 Vivien Foster (2005, p. 7) estimated that 41 percent of water customers in Latin America were served by 
firms that were regulated but that only 15 percent were served by firms that were privately controlled, 
which suggests that 26 percent were served by regulated public firms.  Regulation of public enterprises may 
be more common in water than in other utilities because in many countries water is provided by small 
municipal companies which are often thought to need national or regional oversight.  
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contracts with otherwise similar firms in the same country.  Most researchers chose 
instead to compare performance trends of firms before and after the negotiation of 
contracts, usually with some simple qualitative assessment of the other factors that might 
have influenced the trends. 
The results of these studies varied considerably.  At one extreme was New 
Zealand, where performance (measured by profits, return on equity, and revenue per 
employee) improved in nine out of ten SOE’s several years after they had been 
corporatized and subjected to a form of performance contracting (Duncan and Bollard, 
1992).  In Korea the average ratio of costs to revenues in a sample of ten SOEs declined 
by 5.4 percentage points compared to what would have been expected during the first 
three years of contracting (Song, 1988).
5  More cautious and probably more typical were 
two studies of Pakistan that reported that profits had increased on average after three 
years.  But both Pakistani studies found that only a bare majority of the firms experienced 
improvements while the others had deteriorated (Shaikh, 1986; Shirley, 1989a). 
These lines of research culminated in the mid 1990s in two studies by Mary 
Shirley and Colin Xu of the World Bank that were highly critical of performance 
contracts.  The first study, featured in an influential 1995 World Bank report titled 
Bureaucrats in Business, examined total factor productivity trends in 12 utilities from 6 
developing countries for 5 years before and 5 years after contracting.  Only 3 of the 12 
utilities experienced a turnaround in performance, while 6 utilities showed no apparent 
improvement and 3 saw a significant decline in performance (World Bank, 1995; Shirley 
and Xu, 1997).  In their second study, Shirley and Xu examined labor productivity in a 
sample of 628 Chinese manufacturing enterprises from 1980 to 1989.  The large number 
of firms made it possible for them to analyze the effectiveness of different features of 
performance contracts, a topic we return to later.  But the conclusion that received the 
most attention was that the average contract did not increase productivity and may have 
actually reduced it (Shirley, 1996; Shirley and Xu, 1998). 
The evaluations of the 1980s and 1990s are often interpreted as showing that the 
experiment with performance contracts was a failure.  But a closer reading suggests that 
                                                 
5 For earlier more qualitative accounts of Korea see Jones (1985), Park (1986) and Ramamurti (1986) 
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tractable than others. 
Contractual Completeness, Complexity and Duration.  One problem apparent 
from the outset was the difficulty of writing a “complete” performance contract.  A 
contract is complete if it anticipates all the important eventualities that might occur 
during the contract’s life and provides sensible contingencies to deal with them.  It is 
difficult to write a complete contract, especially if markets or technologies are changing 
rapidly or the contract duration is long.  For example, incompleteness proved to be a 
problem with the first two performance contracts signed by France: with the national 
electricity company, EDF, in 1970 and the national railway, SNCF, in 1971.  Both 
contracts were intended to last for five years but were rendered obsolete when oil prices 
skyrocketed after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.  The oil crisis caused an unexpected drop 
in demand and increase in costs for both SOEs, but was particularly disruptive for EDF.  
The government ordered EDF to accelerate its investment in nuclear plants to reduce 
France’s dependence on oil, and to abandon a program of promoting the use of electricity 
for home heating that EDF had been counting on to increase capacity utilization and 
operating profits.  The effect was to increase the company’s investment needs while 
reducing its internal financial resources, a problem made worse over the next few years 
when the government refused to allow EDF to raise prices as permitted in its contract for 
fear of further stimulating inflation and discouraging growth.  France did not sign its next 
round of contracts until 1978, and some of these fell prey to the oil crisis after the start of 
the Iraq-Iran war in 1979 (Anastassopoulus, 1981; Carsaladi, 1986; Green, 1982; Nellis, 
1989; Sarma, 1986). 
There are several solutions to the problem of contractual completeness, but some 
of those working on the issue at the time recognized that none was perfect and that best 
approach would depend on the type of firm and its environment (Mallon 1983).  The 
most obvious solution, adopted initially in France and in many of the African countries, is 
to try to write a contract that anticipates every important possibility and provides 
workable contingencies for them.  The dangers are that the contract becomes so complex 
that it has unintended side effects and so detailed and rigid that it stifles entrepreneurial 
behavior.  Moreover, the negotiation and monitoring of such highly detailed and 
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short supply in many developing countries.  In Africa during the 1980s, for example, 
many contracts took years to negotiate and some were never signed because the desire to 
draft a detailed and complete contract made reaching agreement nearly impossible 
(Nellis, 1989).  
A second approach is to keep the duration of the contracts fairly short, often only 
a year.  The shorter the contract, the easier it is to predict the important changes that 
might happen in the contract’s life.  And the shorter the contract, the less time that the 
two parties suffer if something unexpected occurs.  This approach was adopted by Korea 
and Pakistan at the urging of Leroy Jones, one of the influential advocates of 
performance contracts in the 1980s.  Jones argued that short one-year contracts were also 
appropriate because SOE managers seldom controlled major investments and other long-
term decisions.  The key risk of short contracts is that they may divert management 
attention from long-term challenges and choices or, worse, encourage management to 
deliberately sacrifice long-term health for short-term gain.  Jones recognized this problem 
and supplemented his main quantitative performance criteria (a measure of profitability) 
with several qualitative measures of long-term health such as the adequacy of preventive 
maintenance, progress on investment, a well-thought-out corporate plan, sufficient 
research and development and adequate training (Jones, 1981).  A few years into the 
Korean and Pakistan experience, observers reported that the managers thought the 
supplementary measures too subjective (Ramamurti, 1986) and that, despite the 
measures, there were signs that managers were neglecting fundamental policy change 
(Park, 1986) and sacrificing long-term health (Shirley, 1989b). 
Two other approaches, typically used in tandem, are to anticipate frequent 
renegotiation and to focus on the broad goals and principles rather than minutely 
specified performance.  France gradually moved toward this flexible and barebones 
contracting approach during the 1980s, responding both to the difficulties it had 
experienced in forecasting future conditions and to the election of a socialist government 
in 1988 that was less mistrustful of public enterprises (Nellis, 1989, pp. 18-26).  The 
typical duration of a contract was reduced from 5 years to 3 years with a provision for 
annual review if assumptions concerning the future proved inaccurate.  The plans were to 
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the risk of obsolescence and make any renegotiation easier.  The key idea was that the 
process of a periodic formal exchange of views between management and the 
government was more important than the specific targets set. 
It is telling, however, that the French government found it easier to negotiate such 
flexible and barebones plans with enterprises that it thought already well run.  With firms 
that were in more difficult financial condition it apparently resorted to more specific and 
detailed targets of the type originally foreseen when it started experimenting with 
performance contracting in the 1960s.  Flexible and barebones contracting may be more 
acceptable or useful where there is a certain amount of confidence in the firm and a 
relatively stable environment.  John Nellis argues (1989, p. 56) that developing countries 
may face too many potential problems to risk a barebones approach.  
Information Asymmetry and Soft Targets.  A second concern raised by 
performance contracts is that SOE managers are usually much better informed about the 
possibilities for improving their enterprise’s performance than the government officials 
they are negotiating with.  The fear is that managers will take advantage of their superior 
information to negotiate performance targets that are soft (easy to reach) or otherwise 
better suited to the objectives of managers than those of officials.  In economists’ jargon, 
the problem arises because of information asymmetry between principals and their 
agents.  The principals, in this case the firm’s government supervisors, are interested in 
improving the performance of the enterprise while their agents, the managers, may be 
interested in not exerting themselves.  The problem for the principals is that they can 
never know whether their agents are doing as much as they could to improve firm 
performance.  The classic solutions to the problem involve the use of competition, stock 
options and similar devices to align the incentives of the agent with those of the principal 
and to motivate the agent to reveal information. 
The early designers of performance contracts were well aware of the information 
asymmetry problem.  Leroy Jones (1981) advocated giving managers and workers 
bonuses that varied with the amount that the firm exceeded or fell short of its 
performance target.  Jones called these “disclosure bonuses” on the grounds that they 
would induce the mangers to reveal the enterprise’s potential over time.  Richard Mallon 
  21(1983) was skeptical that managers would perform their best knowing that doing so 
would only ratchet up the target for future periods.  Mallon also argued that the 
experience with similar incentive schemes in US military procurement contracts had been 
disappointing because “efficient firms faced with the prospect of sharing profits over 
estimate costs while inefficient firms permitted to share losses underestimate costs” 
(Mallon, 1983, paraphrasing McCall, 1970, p. 844).  Mallon placed more faith in 
competition as a tool for forcing managers to reveal information and proposed that any 
SOE activities that could be hived off into competitive markets should be.  In practice, 
only a handful of developing countries adopted Jones’ suggestion of awarding bonuses to 
managers based on performance, the best documented examples being Korea and 
Pakistan.  There was some introduction of competition but only in industries that were 
not natural monopolies. 
Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest information asymmetry is a 
serious problem and that bonuses, competition and other devices may alleviate it 
somewhat.  Anecdotes about soft targets abound in the literature on performance 
contracts.  And in interviews managers often reported that bonuses gave them an added 
incentive to improve performance as well as a tool with which to motivate staff, although 
less so where the contracts were so short that ratcheting up quickly discouraged effort.  
Shirley and Xu’s first study of 12 utility SOEs failed to find to find any significant 
relationship between firm performance and contract features designed to reduce the 
managers’ information advantage, but that was probably because the sample size was 
small.
6  In their second study of 628 Chinese manufacturing firms, however, Shirley and 
Xu found that productivity was higher if the firm’s performance was judged primarily by 
profits rather than by more complex measures that the managers might more easily 
manipulate.  They also found that productivity increased if a significant portion of wages 
depended on firm performance, if the managers were selected through a process of 
competitive bidding and if the firm operated in a more competitive industry.
7
                                                 
6 Shirley and Xu (1997) hypothesized that government officials could counter the managers’ advantage by 
insisting on contracts with a few key financial measures, not changing the measures often and rewarding 
managers who performed well with bonuses or non-financial awards.  They found no apparent correlation 
between firm performance and these features. 
7 Although these features significantly improved performance, the gain was not enough to make contracting 
advantageous.  This result occurred because Shirley and Xu (1998) estimated that a basic contract, without 
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raised by the contracting experience was the frequency with which governments reneged 
on commitments made in performance contracts.  Not all governments reneged: there 
were no complaints about Korea or New Zealand, for example.  Korea gradually lost 
interest in performance contracting over time, turning increasingly to privatization but 
without reneging on specific contracts in the process.  New Zealand remained a supporter 
of performance contracting, extending the idea to regular government departments as 
well as government-owned corporations (Schick, 1996).  But Korea and New Zealand 
were exceptions as reneging was common in both industrialized and developing 
countries. 
In France, for example, the government often prevented the SOEs from exercising 
pricing or other commercial freedoms promised in their contracts even when there was no 
unexpected event, like an oil crisis, to make the contract obsolete.  The French contracts 
established compensation for specific public service obligations imposed on the firms, 
such as the requirement that EDF buy French coal or that SNCF operate unprofitable 
regional passenger trains.  Beyond such specific subventions, however, the idea was that 
the firms would be allowed sufficient flexibility in pricing, service and staffing decisions 
to become financially self supporting.  When the time came to raise prices, shutdown 
unprofitable routes or coal mines, reduce staff or take similar politically sensitive steps, 
however, the government often asked the enterprise to show restraint.  The result was that 
financial targets and government support often had to be adjusted. 
In developing countries the problem seemed more severe, perhaps because of a 
greater gap between resources and aspirations.  John Nellis (1989) recounts the 
experience of Senegal where, as in other poor countries, the government often failed to 
pay the bills for utility services supplied to government offices by SOEs, let alone honor 
its promises to provide compensation for public service obligations.  As a consequence, 
the performance contracts negotiated in Senegal during the 1980s typically included 
commitments from the government to stay current on bills and subsidies and to meet a 
schedule for the payment of arrears.  The financial promises in the initial round of 
                                                                                                                                                 
any of these favorable features, caused a statistically significant decrease in productivity, a curious finding 
that they never explained. 
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between the SOEs and their technical ministries, without the involvement of central 
budgeting and finance agencies that might have been more concerned about the claims 
being made on state resources.  But shifting the responsibility for contract negotiation and 
enforcement to special units within the Office of the President and the Ministry of 
Finance also proved ineffective.  Officials were pressed to sign unrealistic contracts in the 
hope that more resources would eventually appear, or that postponing hard choices would 
allow the government more flexibility to decide who needed assistance the most when the 
budget crisis arrived. 
In economics jargon, the problem was not so much that the principals could not 
control their agents but that the principals themselves had conflicting and unrealistic 
goals.  On the one hand, they wanted efficient and well-run SOEs that provided good 
service without imposing an excessive drain on the treasury.  On the other hand, they also 
wanted lower tariffs, more extensive services and higher levels of staffing than could be 
supported by commercial operation or, in the case of Senegal, available government 
resources.  In retrospect, it was naive to think that a mere piece of paper—a contract—
would be enough to change the underlying political forces that supported such conflicting 
goals or to stop government officials from intervening when important goals seemed at 
risk.  As one observer put it at the time: 
Regulations in some countries that oblige government officials to give 
instructions to SOE managers in writing have not prevented them from 
getting on the phone, and politicians are not likely to give up lightly one of 
their main stratagems for reconciling conflict and building coalitions, 
namely, keeping their objectives and commitments purposefully vague. 
(Mallon, 1983) 
Interestingly, French officials and managers still were largely supportive of 
performance contracting in the 1980s, despite the fact that the enterprises were not 
always given the flexibility promised.  They found the process of negotiating and 
renegotiating contracts useful to clarify the relations between the company and the 
government, to press the government to adopt more consistent policies and to make the 
company’s performance more transparent (Carsaladi, 1986).  The Senegalese, on the 
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effort (Nellis, 1989).  Neither France nor Senegal ever resolved the problem of 
conflicting objectives, but France had the resources to compensate the enterprise, at least 
in part, when the government interfered.  In Senegal, by contrast, the solution was often 
to simply slash the promised aid without adjusting the enterprise’s responsibilities.  It is 
not surprising that the Senegalese managers became cynical about the advantages of 
negotiating a plan, or felt little responsibility for complying with their part of the bargain. 
 
Corporatization 
There are few studies from developing countries of the effects of corporatization 
even though it appears to have been a reasonably popular reform.
8  One reason is the 
difficulty of getting good financial data on government departments to compare with the 
data from their corporatized successors.  Another reason is that corporatization was often 
accompanied by some form of performance contract, which makes it difficult to 
disentangle their effects.  The few reports on the subject cite several examples where 
corporatization is thought to have improved performance but also include warnings that 
the reform can take many years to implement and that the transformation is often 
“incomplete” in as much as the firm is still unable to lay off excess employees or charge 
realistic prices (World Bank, 1994, pp. 40-41; Estache, 1994).  
These cautions are confirmed by the experience of industrialized countries, where 
corporatization has been more closely studied.  The Britain’s experience is particularly 
interesting because its nationalized industries enjoyed many of the corporate governance 
provisions recently recommended by the OECD for SOEs.  The nationalization statutes 
of 1945 to 1951 gave the boards of directors of British SOEs substantial independence 
from ministerial interference, a concession apparently made to help win private sector 
support for the state takeover of the industries.
9  Ministers could appoint the board 
members and set their salaries, but could dismiss them only for certain restricted reasons.  
                                                 
8 One of the few quantitative studies of corporatization alone (without a performance contract) examines 18 
vegetable oil firms in Pakistan whose performance improved after they were moved from provincial 
government control to a national corporation.  Whether the improvement was due to the shift from 
provincial to national control or from a government department to a corporate form is unclear (Shaikh, 
1988). 
9 The architect of nationalization, Herbert Morrison, imagined an “arm’s length” relationship, explaining 
that “no self respecting board would tolerate political interference” (Redwood and Hatch, 1982, p. 24). 
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interest, although that provision was rarely used because the advice had to be in writing 
and defended in detail.  The Treasury had to approve any borrowing by the nationalized 
firms, but the firms could invest from their own cash flow.  Finally, the nationalization 
statutes also required the firms to breakeven but only on average, “taking one year with 
another”, a loophole that had been inserted to make it possible to deliberately incur 
deficits to stimulate the economy in the event of a recession.  These exceptions aside, the 
board was pretty much free to set policy as it saw fit.  Indeed legally the ministry was not 
even a shareholder—the board owned the corporation in trust. 
The government issued three white papers in an effort to gain more control over 
the enterprises and encourage their efficiency.  The first, in 1961, tightened the 
requirement to breakeven by specifying that it be over a five-year period and include an 
allowance for depreciation.  The second, in 1967, sought to further improve efficiency by 
requiring that prices be set at long-run marginal costs, that new investments be evaluated 
by discounting their cash flows at 8 percent, and that social obligations of the enterprise 
be explicitly priced out so that the firm could be required to breakeven on its other 
services.  The final white paper, in 1978, corrected some practical problems with the 
earlier pricing and rate-of-return mandates
10 and required the firm to produce a corporate 
plan including performance measures.  The technical ministry and the Treasury would 
consider the plan in setting financial targets for the coming year, including the “external 
financing limit”, the British government’s term for Treasury financial support.  The firms 
made efforts to comply with the white paper mandates even though the mandates 
apparently had no legal standing, but their efforts were seldom enough to elicit the 
efficiency improvements desired. 
Most British scholars believe that the boards enjoyed substantial autonomy under 
this system, despite their frequent complaints of political interference.
11  Even enterprises 
like British Rail, that were highly dependent on external financing from the Treasury, 
                                                 
10 The 1978 white paper allowed firms to abandon marginal cost pricing when it conflicted with breaking 
even and required firms to earn a return of 5 percent on their overall investment program instead of an 8 
percent return from the unreliable forecasts of cash flows for individual projects. 
11 Christopher Foster (1992, pp. 70-101) gives an eloquent description of how the boards manage to 
exercise substantial autonomy while Ray Rees (1976, pp. 12-23) stresses a “tripartite” sharing of power 
between the board, the technical ministry and the Treasury.  For a detailed account of the relationship 
between boards, ministers and Treasury in the case of British Rail see Gourvish (2002). 
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public enterprises if they were sufficiently resolute and skillful.  But the task of cutting 
support was “essentially a game of poker, with the departments not always holding the 
stronger hand” (Harrison, 1988, p. 31).  For example, British Rail boards often fended off 
proposed financing cuts by warning, in public if need be, that the cuts would lead to 
dangerous reductions in the level of investment and safety or to drastic pruning of the 
route network and services.  Ministers ignored board warnings at their peril, not just 
because the members were supposed to be experts in their fields but also because it gave 
the board an excuse for future poor performance.  And if, half way through the fiscal 
year, it became clear that the firm needed more external support than agreed upon, the 
minister and the Treasury faced the unattractive choice of either paying up or forcing 
immediate cuts in service or investment so drastic that they lent credence to board 
warnings about the firm’s long-term health.  Uncooperative board members could be 
replaced when their terms expired, but even that was not so easy since the low pay made 
it difficult to recruit qualified candidates.  Moreover, ministers tended to change much 
more rapidly than boards, and most new ministers arrived with little knowledge of the 
firm.  Most boards were also smart enough to yield to some ministerial requests, as the 
price of their independence on more important matters.  And the ambiguities of the 
situation gave both sides an alibi for poor performance: the boards could blame political 
interference, while the ministers blamed the boards’ failure to follow their guidance 
(Foster, 1992, pp. 79-86). 
The boards seldom used their independence to emphasize commercial objectives, 
although there were important exceptions.  In the case of British Rail, for example, 
during the early 1960s a board led by Chairman Richard Beeching managed to prune 
unprofitable routes and experiment with new commercial freight services while during 
the early 1980s the board under Chairman Robert Reid reorganized the railroad around 
lines of business to make managers more accountable for profits (Pryke, 1981; Gourvish, 
2002).  More often the boards seemed less sensitive to the firm’s commercial 
performance than to concerns and constituencies within the firm.  British boards were 
thought to be particularly beholden to labor given labor’s ability to disrupt services, and 
to the engineering culture and standards that often dominated the firm.  Thus the 
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capacity to meet projected demand, almost irregardless of the cost (Foster, 1992).  At 
British Rail, for example, successive boards were reluctant to raise the issue of 
eliminating unnecessary firemen or brakemen from train crews or to abandon long-
planned programs of electrification that outsiders thought no longer worthwhile. 
There is little reason to believe that corporatization will be better at promoting a 
commercial orientation in developing countries than in Britain.  The boards probably 
would not enjoy as much autonomy as in Britain, and even if they did there is little reason 
to believe they would use their discretion to advance commercial objectives.  Over the 
forty-year history of Britain’s nationalized industries the boards didn’t seem much more 
interested than the ministers in promoting corporate efficiency. 
There is, however, one advantage of corporatization that may be more important 
in developing countries than it was in Britain: improved information about enterprise 
performance.  Britain’s public corporations were created by nationalizing private 
corporations, and the quality of information may have actually declined in the process 
because the nationalization statutes did not hold the public corporations to the same strict 
accounting and reporting standards that apply to private corporations.  In developing 
countries, by contrast, government-owned corporations are usually created by hiving off 
the commercial activities from regular government departments.  This separation of legal 
identities, and presumably of accounts, should make it easier to monitor the enterprise’s 
performance than it was when the enterprise was buried inside the department.  But if 
additional information is a key advantage, then developing countries should avoid 
Britain’s mistake of failing to establish clear reporting and accounting standards for the 
new public enterprises.  The easiest course of action may be to incorporate the public 
firms under the same laws that govern private corporations, since those laws typically 
apply fairly strict reporting standards.
12  
 
Special Supervisory or Regulatory Units 
                                                 
12 Alternatively, the government might require the public enterprises to supply the same kinds of 
information that government regulators usually require of private utilities; see Coelli et. al. (2003). 
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study, particularly holding companies and other special public enterprise units popular 
from the 1960s through the 1980s.  Some of these units were not designed to insulate the 
enterprises from pressure to pursue non-commercial objectives, despite rhetoric to the 
contrary.  In India and Egypt, for example, SOE holding companies were organized by 
industry—such as steel, coal, banking or textiles—and reported to the relevant technical 
ministry (Kumar, 1993; and Muir and Saba, 1995, pp. 38-40).  The typical mandate of a 
holding company was to promote the “integrated” development of its industry, which it 
often interpreted as helping weaker firms survive by restraining competition or arranging 
cross-subsidies.  The holding companies probably made it easier for the technical 
ministries to control their industries because the ministries no longer had to deal 
individually with the half-dozen or more nationalized firms in each industry.
13
More relevant for our purposes are supervisory units or holding companies 
established to block the technical ministries, usually the main culprits in meddling.  Such 
units usually reported to the ministry of finance or the office of the president or prime 
minister instead of the technical ministry.  Observers thought that these units were most 
effective when they had a small but well qualified staff, enjoyed access to the highest 
levels of government and had a clear mandate and responsibilities (Shirley and Nellis, 
1991, pp. 29-39).  But ministries of finance were not immune to pressures about non-
commercial goals, even if they were more sensitive to the need to limit budgetary support 
to SOEs.  And eventually many of these special supervisory units became the conduit of 
non-commercial considerations.  Indeed, the holding company is a variation of the 
standard corporate form, so it would be surprising if it could succeed in providing 
autonomy in situations where corporatization could not (Ghai, 1990, p. 24). 
Of special interest for infrastructure are the more recent proposals to subject 
government-owned utilities to the same kind of tariff and quality-of-service regulation 
used to prevent monopoly abuse by private utilities.  As would be the case with private 
monopolies, the regulatory agency typically enjoys some degree of independence from 
                                                 
13 It is telling that the holding company is usually seen as a way to increase shareholder control over 
enterprises in the private sector but as a means of reducing shareholder interference in the public sector.  
For comparisons of the advantages and disadvantages of holding companies in the public and private 
sectors see Ghai (1990) and Kumar (1993). 
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costs of an efficient firm.  The idea is that the regulator will use its position and technical 
expertise to discourage the ministry from imposing unreasonable public service 
obligations without compensation while encouraging the public enterprise to be efficient. 
The experience with monopoly regulation of public enterprises is too recent and 
limited to draw firm conclusions about its efficacy.  Proponents cite Chile and, more 
recently, Scotland as examples of success.  Scotland kept its water industry in public 
hands when England and Wales privatized water in 1989, but ten years later it decided to 
apply the same form of price regulation used to control the private water companies in 
England and Wales to the public companies in Scotland.  Unlike Chile, Scotland views 
regulation as a long-term measure rather than a transition to privatization.
14  Agencies of 
the Scottish government establish the standards for drinking water quality and waste 
water treatment and an independent regulatory body, the Water Industry Commission for 
Scotland, sets the prices that it estimates should be sufficient for an efficient firm to 
recover its costs.  Prices are established for four-year periods using the price-cap system 
developed by Britain to provide efficiency incentives for regulated firms (Gomez-Ibanez, 
2003, pp. 217-223).  If the company fails to recover its costs at regulated prices, then the 
Scottish Executive, which owns the company, must make up the difference.  The 
compensation of the water company’s managers is linked to the firm’s performance.  The 
Scottish water company was able to meet its efficiency targets and live within regulated 
prices in its first four-year control period.
15
The experience with regulation is not wholly positive.  In Scotland, for example, 
some critics complain that the Water Industry Commission imposes an expensive layer of 
bureaucracy onto a small company that was already closely supervised by government.  
And in Latin America, where regulation of public water companies has become more 
common, Vivien Foster (2005, p. 20) reports that it has been harder for regulators to 
promote efficiency improvements because public companies are not motivated by profit 
                                                 
14  The government intended to introduce competition in bulk water and wastewater services and in 
retailing (customer billing and service) but the basic functions of delivering water to and collecting 
wastewater from households and businesses would remain a monopoly in public hands. 
15 When the scheme started there were three companies; these were consolidated into one company, 
Scottish Water, in 2002.  From 1999 to 2005 there was a single water commissioner but since 2005 the 
commission has had five members.  See Byatt (2006 and 2007), Sutherland (2006) and Water Industry 
Commission for Scotland (2005). 
  30and thus do not respond to the efficiency incentives in price caps, the most widely used 
form of tariff regulation.  This problem could be remedied, as it was in Scotland, by tying 
management compensation to efficiency targets, but that step was controversial in 
Scotland and might be even more so in a developing country.  More generally, 
maintaining the independence and technical capability of regulatory agencies has proven 
to be difficult in many developing countries, and these problems will presumably be no 
easier if the firms being regulated are public rather than private. 
 
Prospects 
The logic of clarifying responsibilities is hard to deny:  it is difficult to imagine 
how the performance of an SOE can be improved without a more explicit understanding 
between the government and the firm. It is striking, for example, that a recent study of 
eleven of the best-performing government-owned water utilities revealed that all eleven 
had some kind of performance contract and ten were either incorporated or a separate 
statutory authority.
16  Nevertheless, both experience and logic suggest two important 
limitations to the strategy. 
First, clarifying responsibilities is unlikely to succeed where there is serious 
conflict over the goals that the public enterprise should pursue.  Performance contracts, 
corporatization and special supervisory agencies may help expose and clarify the nature 
of the disagreements, but exposure alone is unlikely to lead to consensus.  Performance 
contracts that are “paper thin”—glossing over serious and unresolved disputes about 
resources and priorities—are unlikely to be enforced or honored. 
Second, even with a reasonable consensus on goals, performance contracts and 
related measures presume administrative capacities and traditions not always found in the 
governments of developing countries.  Nellis notes that that the transactions skills needed 
to negotiate and monitor workable contracts are often in short supply in government.  
Allen Schick (1998) goes further to argue that the contractual approach at the heart of 
these strategies is at odds with the culture of informality in the public sectors of many 
developing countries.  Governments in developing countries typically have extensive 
                                                 
16 These eleven water utilities were chosen by reputation rather than by any more systematic sampling 
process; see Baietti et al. (2006). 
  31formal control systems—such as auditing and civil service agencies—and on paper 
everything is done according to rule.  But in practice the rules are often so unrealistic or 
excessively rigid that civil servants must circumvent them to be effective.  In this context, 
even a well-drafted contract might not be honored. 
These limitations suggest that a strategy of clarifying responsibilities is less likely 
to be successful in countries that are very poor.  Conflict over commercial and non-
commercial goals is likely to be more intense and difficult to manage, if only because 
poverty makes infrastructure tariffs that much more sensitive and SOE jobs more highly 
prized.  And poor countries are more likely to have limited administrative capacities and 
traditions that make it difficult to negotiate and enforce contracts or establish an 
independent regulator or supervisory agency. 
It is probably sensible to think of a strategy of clarifying responsibilities as 
proceeding in stages, with simple measures first and more complicated and elaborate 
schemes only as experience, capacity and consensus permit.  In this regard 
corporatization is probably the best first step in that its application is not too demanding 
and, by separating the accounts of the enterprise from those of the ministry, it begins to 
generate the types of information that are necessary for managerial accountability.   
Establishing an independent regulator or supervisory agency or negotiating an explicit 
performance contract might wait until conflicts over goals had lessened and 
administrative experience increased. 
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Allies of Reform 
A third approach to SOE reform is to change the balance of political interests that 
bear on the enterprise to favor those interested in commercial behavior.  Opportunities for 
reform arise when events temporarily alter the political economy of the firm.  A budget 
crisis may strengthen the hand of fiscal conservatives for a time, for example, or an 
economic boom may lessen pressures to pursue social goals temporarily.  The idea is to 
exploit these occasions to permanently change the firm’s environment in a manner that 
sustains reform.  Privatization permanently alters the political dynamic by creating a new 
party, the private investor, with an interest in commercial behavior and tools to protect 
those interests.  Similar schemes, short of privatization, might be used to mobilize or 
strengthen allies of reform. 
Three obvious groups might support reform: taxpayers, customers and investors; 
but each has its limitations.  Taxpayers are interested in reducing the drain on the 
government treasury, but their influence is limited by lack of information and problems 
of collective action.  Taxpayers are typically less well informed about the possibilities for 
improving SOE performance than government officials or SOE managers.  They also 
have little incentive to spend the time and resources needed to influence an SOE’s 
performance since the potential gain to any individual taxpayer is small.  Moreover, all 
taxpayers will gain if any subset of them is successful in improving SOE performance, 
which creates a further incentive not to act in the hopes of free riding on the efforts of 
others.  Customers have mixed interests in that they want the SOE to produce quality 
services efficiently but they also stand to benefit from government subsidies to the firm.  
Customers have reasonable information and incentives to act if the SOE competes with 
other firms for their patronage; if not, they face information asymmetry and collective 
action problems similar to those that plague taxpayers.  Finally, private investors in an 
SOE have an interest in its commercial behavior, although they also have an interest in 
receiving subsidies or being protected from competition.  investors in firms that compete 
with an SOE have an interest in the SOE not receiving subsidies or other advantages. 
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Many schemes seek to change the balance of political interests by providing 
taxpayers and consumers with better information about the possibilities to improve SOE 
performance.  Schemes to clarify SOE responsibilities have the potential to act this way, 
although that is not usually their main intent.  Proponents of such schemes typically 
assume, implicitly or explicitly, that reasonable people can agree on the goals of the 
enterprise, the only problem is to make that consensus explicit.  To the extent that 
clarifying responsibilities alters politics, however, it does so by alerting and arming 
taxpayers and customers with better information.  Performance contracts, for example, 
offer taxpayers and customers a yardstick against which to measure the behavior of 
managers and politicians.  Similarly, corporatization clarifies the accounting while 
special supervisory agencies promise opinions on firm performance that are expert and 
less compromised by non-commercial concerns. 
Other schemes focus more directly on the possibility of empowering taxpayers 
and consumers by providing better information on the performance they should expect.  
Often this information is obtained through some kind of benchmarking exercise.  For 
example, the Ministry of Power in India recently decided to publish statistics comparing 
the performance of 29 state electricity companies.  Other possibilities involve publicizing 
the services that SOEs have promised to provide.  For example, international aid agencies 
usually insist that large signs be placed next to public works projects describing, briefly, 
the works promised, the date on which they are to be completed, the funding supplied and 
the responsible agency.  The sign tells the community what to expect and who to 
complain to if those expectations are not meet.  Yet another approach is to ask the public 
to rate the quality of the service the enterprise supplies and to publicize the results.  In 
1993, for example, a citizens group in Bangalore began to issue periodic “report cards” 
on municipal utilities and services.  The report cards are based on careful household 
surveys of service use, general satisfaction, frequency of problems, how many visits it 
took to resolve them, the frequency of bribes and the amounts paid.  This scheme has 
inspired similar efforts in other cities in India and elsewhere. 
Efforts to use better information to mobilize taxpayers and customers are seldom 
evaluated systematically.  One careful quantitative study showed that corruption in 
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of the amount of central grant that their school was supposed to receive (Svensson, 2005, 
pp. 35-36).  A more qualitative evaluation of the Bangalore report cards credited them 
with stimulating improvements, although the gains were uneven (improving in some 
agencies, declining in others) and slower than hoped for (Paul, 2002). 
One limitation of these schemes is their need for accurate, credible and 
understandable the information.  High quality information has the potential to shift the 
burden of proof about the possibility of improving performance from the taxpayers and 
customers to the firm.  But gaining such information is often difficult.   Benchmarking, 
for example, requires the ability to identify reasonably comparable enterprises or to 
adjust the data for important differences in the firms or their environments.  Similarly, 
household surveys must be based on careful sampling if they are to be representative and 
consistent over time.  Moreover, the performance measures must not only represent the 
firm’s performance fairly but be simple and intuitive enough for the public to understand.  
The effort to benchmark the Indian electricity companies is unlikely to have much 
impact, for example, because the measures developed are so complex that they appear 
arbitrary and unintelligible. 
The second and arguably more serious problem is that providing information 
alone does little to overcome the obstacles to collective action faced by taxpayers and 
customers.  Information reduces the cost of influence, but it does not solve the problem of 
free-riding.  The problems of collective action may be manageable if a community is 
small enough and the service is important enough that informal social pressures are 
sufficient to offset the incentives to free ride.  But in larger communities effective 
collective action is likely to depend on the presence of strong institutions of civil 
society—churches, residents’ associations, professional associations, unions and other 
civic and non-governmental organizations—that are already well organized and whose 
membership cares about the services involved.  Even in Bangalore, where one might 
think conditions were relatively favorable, the limited capacity and interest of local civil 
society made it difficult to orchestrate a groundswell of public opinion and to translate 
that groundswell into effective and sustained pressure on public agencies. 
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Another strategy to change the political landscape is to allow private companies 
or other SOEs to compete directly with the public enterprise for customers.  Competition 
works in part by generating information, since customers and taxpayers can compare the 
performance of the incumbent SOE with that of its competitors.  But direct competition 
also reduces the problem of collective action since improvement does not require 
coordinated political pressure on the public agency but results, instead, from the 
incentives that individual customers have to shift to the better firm.  Finally, competition 
creates a new constituency for reform:  the owners and employees of the competing 
private firms. 
Direct competition is a fairly common strategy for SOEs in industries where 
demand is expanding and there are few characteristics of natural monopoly.  One 
common example is urban bus services, which are provided by both government-owned 
and private firms in many developing countries.  Usually private minibus operators 
appear when the demand for bus services is growing, the public bus company is losing 
money and the government can’t afford the added subsidies that would be required to 
expand the public company’s services.  Sometimes the government allows the public 
company to collapse after a few years, but often it simply stops increasing subsidies to 
the public company so that public and private operators coexist, although with the private 
services expanding to meet demand.  Other common examples are mobile telephones and 
ports, where governments sometimes grant private companies mobile licenses or 
concessions to build new port terminals without closing or privatizing the incumbent 
state-owned telephone company or terminal operator. 
Evidence suggests that competition improves the performance of SOEs, but that 
competition alone can not replicate the effects of privatization.  In the two most important 
of the few empirical studies that compare competition and privatization, Anthony 
Boardman and Aidan Vining analyzed various profitability and productivity measures for 
the 500 largest non-US industrial firms in the world (Boardman and Vining, 1989) and 
the 500 largest non-financial firms in Canada (Vining and Boardman, 1992).  In both 
studies Boardman and Vining found that higher levels of competition in an industry were 
associated with improved productivity and reduced profits.  But they also found that 
  36private firms outperformed SOEs at any given level of competition.  A study of 
thousands of Indonesian manufacturing firms reached similar conclusions (Bartel and 
Harrison, 2005). 
The biggest gains may come not from improving the performance of the 
incumbent SOE but from insuring that future market growth is met by more efficient 
private operators.  In urban bus services, for example, the SOE seldom achieves the 
economies of the private operator, at least as long as the state is still willing to provide it 
with some level of subsidies.  Preserving the SOE allows the government to avoid layoffs 
or other controversies associated with closure or privatization.  But opening the market to 
private operators puts an effective cap on SOE subsidies especially if the private 
operators can recover their costs while charging the same fare as the public company.  
Meanwhile the private operators and their employees are motivated to oppose any 
substantial expansion of the SOE’s market share. 
One potential complication is insuring that the playing field between the SOE and 
the private firms is relatively level so that the customers’ choice of firms improves the 
welfare of society as a whole as well as that of the customers.  In the case of urban buses, 
for example, critics often complain that the private minibuses are driven recklessly and 
generate more traffic accidents and congestion per passenger than the full-size buses 
typically operated by the SOE.  Similarly, with mobile telephones questions often ariise 
as to whether the charges for accessing a competitor’s lines to terminate a call unduly 
favor either the incumbent SOE or the challengers.  In principle, such problems should be 
correctable. 
A more important limitation is that direct competition is hard to apply to 
industries with characteristics of natural monopoly.  Sometimes activities that are 
potentially competitive can be separated from those that are not, as in the separation of 
mobile and fixed-line services in telephony.  But in industries where there are no 
potentially competitive activities or where separation poses practical problems, direct 
competition is not an option. 
 
Mixed-Capital Enterprises 
  37Another possibility for changing the political economy of an SOE is to finance 
part of its capital from private investors.  The government retains a controlling share of 
the equity, but sells a portion of its equity or debt to private investors.  This strategy 
generates information, particularly if the firm has to be evaluated by a rating agency in 
order to sell debt, if it has to meet stock exchange reporting requirements in order to sell 
shares and if the shares are publicly traded.  But it offers the added advantage of creating 
a group of private investors with a stake in the profitability of the company.  The hope is 
that this group will make it harder for the government to pursue social goals by the 
traditional route of accepting a lower return on SOE investments (McFetridge, 1985, p. 
208).  From this perspective mixed-capital enterprises are a deliberate compromise 
between commercial and social objectives.  Private investors provide profit and 
efficiency incentives while public ownership allows the government to monitor its social 
or strategic concerns with an insider’s perspective (Boardman, Eckel and Vining, 1985, 
pp. 235-236). 
Many SOEs in industrialized countries and larger SOEs in the more prosperous 
developing countries sell debt to private investors that is secured only by the assets of the 
enterprise, without any formal backing or guarantees from the government..  For 
example, many of the statutory authorities that operate airports, seaports, toll 
expressways and water and sewage systems in the United States sell bonds backed by 
only the authorities’ revenues.
17  
SOEs with private shareholders are less common, although they increased 
significantly in developing countries in the 1960s.  Some of the early mixed enterprises 
were the product of government bailouts of failing private companies, intended to prevent 
employment losses or plant closures.  The government sometimes received an equity 
stake in return, in the hope that it could recoup some of its assistance in the event of a 
turnaround.  But most mixed enterprises created in the 1960s were the product of import 
substitution, the dominant economic development strategy at the time.  Developing 
countries sought to grow by substituting domestic manufacturing for imports.  The 
                                                 
17  In the U.S. case the bonds are not sold to enlist private investors to monitor the authorities.  The motive 
instead is to take advantage of the income-tax advantages that government debt offers private investors 
while keeping the debt off the already heavily burdened balance sheets of state or municipal governments 
(Leigland, 1994). 
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even with the best technology a domestic plant seldom had the scale or experience to 
compete internationally, and thus could survive only behind the protection of import 
quotas, tariffs or other trade barriers.  The solution was often a joint venture between a 
multinational firm and the government with the government receiving a minority share of 
the equity.  The government’s stake was intended in part to motivate it to maintain the 
import protection the firm needed.  Many governments expropriated or bought out the 
private equity in these joint ventures during the 1970s and 1980s. 
A new generation of mixed enterprise companies appeared in the 1990s, most as a 
byproduct of privatization.  Many firms were privatized by selling shares but with the 
government retaining control, at least initially.  A study of 630 share issue privatizations 
in 59 developing and industrialized countries between 1977 and 1997 found that only 
11.5 percent of the initial offers were for all the shares (Jones et al., 1999, pp. 230-232).  
The average initial offer was for 43.9 percent of the shares, and these were frequently 
sold to domestic and small investors as a sign that the government would not interfere.  In 
many cases the government eventually sold its share holdings, but in some countries, 
such as Singapore, it did not.
18
The effects of selling SOE debt to private investors have been much less studied 
than the effects of selling equity, but there are good reasons to believe that selling debt is 
less effective in encouraging commercial behavior.  Investors in debt have a weaker 
incentive to monitor the firm’s performance since any interest and principal payments 
due on debt must be paid before dividends are paid to shareholders.  As a result, debt 
holders are interested primarily in insuring that the SOE is profitable enough to pay its 
debts, and have little concern about the returns to equity.  Moreover, debt holders may 
have stronger reasons to believe that the government is implicitly guaranteeing their 
investment.  If shareholders don’t receive dividends the share price drops, which is 
embarrassing enough.  But if debt holders are not paid then the firm can be thrown into 
bankruptcy with the creditors taking over, which is even more embarrassing.  The fact 
                                                 
18 Singapore’s motive was not so much to improve efficiency, since its SOEs were thought to be fairly 
efficient already, but rather to further develop the domestic stock market.  Singapore retained a controlling 
share of the largest and most important SOEs, however, presumably to insure an inside look and the 
opportunity, in an emergency, to intervene (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2005c). 
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sell debt is a sign of that private investors believe that the government will step in, if 
necessary, to prevent default.  
This is not to argue that selling debt has no beneficial effect on firm behavior.  
The information generated may be an important aid to customers and taxpayers, 
particularly because the sale of debt often requires that the firm submit to external 
auditing.  Another route of influence is that bondholders may insist on covenants that 
constrain the firm’s behavior in important ways.  The most famous example is the 
covenants on the revenue bonds issued by the Port of New York Authority in the 1930s 
and 1940s that prohibited the use of the authority’s bridge and tunnel toll revenues for 
any use besides maintaining the bridges and tunnels and related roadways.  This 
requirement was allegedly engineered by Robert Moses, the head of the Port Authority 
and famous “master builder” of New York, to insure that politicians couldn’t raid his 
enterprise’s revenues for causes he didn’t approve of, such as subsidizing mass transit 
(Caro, 1972).  The effectiveness of this strategy diminished when it became apparent that 
private investors were willing to buy Port Authority bonds without such covenants.  But 
it is common for bond covenants to require that the firm maintain certain coverage ratios 
or reserves. 
The empirical evidence on whether selling equity improves efficiency is mixed 
but generally encouraging.  Boardman and Vining’s two studies described earlier give 
different results:  mixed equity enterprises perform no better (and by some measures 
worse) than other SOEs using the sample of the 500 largest non-US industrial firms in the 
world (Boardman and Vining, 1989) but they perform better than other SOEs (although 
not as well as private companies) using the sample of the 500 largest non-financial firms 
in Canada (Vining and Boardman, 1992).  A study of some 400 Indian non-financial 
companies of which 42 were partially privatized finds that the initial listing of an SOE on 
the stock exchange is associated with an increase in profits and productivity and that the 
effects increase with the percentage of shares sold (Gupta, 2005).  And a comparison of 
26 mixed enterprises in Singapore with a matched set of 26 private Singaporean 
  40companies in the same industries found no significant differences in efficiency and 
profitability (Feng et al., 2004).
19
Although the empirical studies are generally favorable, the performance of mixed 
enterprises probably varies substantially and in ways we only partially understand.  The 
characteristics of the shareholders probably matter considerably.  The studies described 
above count as a mixed enterprise any company which has both public and private 
shareholders, but performance may depend on the percentage that is privately owned and 
how widely distributed share ownership is.  The agency exercising the government’s 
ownership responsibilities is presumably also important.  An inexperienced technical 
ministry may interfere too much, for example, or conceivably be taken advantage of by 
the private co-investors.  By the same token, a special government holding company may 
be particularly advantageous if it is more sensitive to the importance of respecting 
minority shareholder rights.  Singapore manages most of its mixed enterprises through a 
special holding company, for example, while in Canada Vining and Boardman (1992, p. 
227) found that the mixed enterprises supervised by a holding company performed better 
than those that were not. 
The level of competition in the industry probably matters as well since 
competition should reinforce the pressures from private investors to pursue efficiency and 
profits.  Competition also makes it possible to avoid the problem of regulating the firm’s 
tariffs, which adds another layer of complexity to the relationship between the 
government and the mixed enterprise.  Unfortunately none of the studies of mixed 
enterprise focus on infrastructure or other industries that have elements of monopoly.
20  
Finally, the laws concerning corporate governance, the quality of securities 
regulation and the integrity of the legal system presumably matter as well. The concern is 
whether minority and small shareholders have the information and the opportunity they 
need to influence important decisions of the firm.  The favorable studies described above 
all involve countries—Canada, India, Singapore—with well-run stock markets and well-
regarded legal systems.  
                                                 
19 Ramirez and Tan (2003) find that mixed enterprises trade at a market premium of 20 percent, which they 
attribute to the investors’ belief—correct or not—that the Singapore government would not allow a mixed 
enterprise to fail.  
20 Broadman and Vining deliberately exclude utilities, for example, while the sample of 26 Singaporean 
SOEs used by Feng and his colleagues includes only one utility (Singtel).  
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Customer-Governed Enterprises 
Schemes that give customers a greater role in the governance of the enterprise 
offer another possibility for encouraging more commercial behavior.  The customers’ 
normal route of influence is through their purchasing decisions, a route that works best 
when the firm must compete with others for the customers’ patronage.  Thus customer-
governed enterprises are of particular interest in very thin markets or in industries, such 
as utilities or infrastructure, thought to have characteristics of natural monopoly. 
The best-known form of customer-governed enterprise is the cooperative.  The 
legal criteria vary by country, but typically a cooperative has open and voluntary 
membership, each member contributes share capital (although often only a token 
amount), the members control the enterprise democratically (with one member, one vote) 
and any profits distributed are allocated on the basis of the member’s business with the 
cooperative.  Cooperatives can be organized by producers, workers or consumers.   
Worker cooperatives, established to insure decent wages and working conditions, are 
probably the least common form.  Producer cooperatives are more popular, especially in 
the agricultural sector where farmers often band together to market their crops or to 
bargain for lower prices from input suppliers.  Consumer cooperatives, which are our 
primary concern, are found in a wide variety of industries ranging from credit unions to 
housing, childcare and utilities. 
Most consumer cooperatives are small, and utility and infrastructure cooperatives 
are no exception.  The United States has roughly 900 electricity and 270 telephone 
cooperatives, for example, but the typical cooperative is a small rural system that serves 
10,000 or 20,000 households.  One of the largest utility cooperatives in the world is the 
water and sewage company in Santa Cruz (Bolivia) which serves 752,000 people with 
120,483 connections (Ruiz-Mier and van Ginneken, 2006). 
Large consumer cooperatives are found in the finance and insurance industries, 
but they have been declining in importance in recent years.  Finance and insurance 
cooperatives are often called mutual associations because their activities involve pooling 
community (or mutual) resources to provide members loans for homebuilding or 
protection in old age.  Depositors and policyholders are considered members of their 
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Their deposits and the surrender value of their insurance policies constitute their shares in 
the company’s capital.  The mutuals’ share of the savings and insurance markets has 
declined rapidly in Britain and the United States during the last 15 years.  Defenders 
blame the decline on the difficulties that mutuals face in growing and diversifying 
quickly enough to remain competitive, especially since members are their only source of 
equity capital (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2004).  But critics argue that the large premiums 
that shareholder banks and insurance companies typically pay members to acquire their 
mutual companies are a sign that the mutuals are not terribly well managed. 
In the last few years Britain has experimented with converting two major utilities 
into a relatively obscure form of non profit called a company limited by guarantee.  This 
form of company has no equity capital and is financed entirely by debt.  It is governed by 
members who are selected by a process, specified in the articles of incorporation, which 
typically requires some representation of customers.  In 2002, Welsh civic leaders and 
utility managers persuaded the British water industry regulator to allow the Welsh water 
and sewage company to be sold to a specially created company limited by guarantee 
called Glas Cymru.  The sale was to prevent the firm, which had been privatized in 1989 
and was not terribly profitable, from falling into the hands of foreign buyers.  Glas 
Cymru’s 50 members are Welsh civic and business leaders, all presumably also 
customers, who elect an eight-member Board of Directors (Gomez-Ibanez, 2005a).  The 
model was used again after Railtrack, a company that had been privatized in 1996 and 
that owned and maintained all of Britain’s rail infrastructure, went bankrupt in 2001.  In 
2002 Railtrack was sold to Network Rail, a company limited by guarantee that is 
governed by 100 members including representatives of railroad users, labor and 
government (Glaister, 2006).
21
The World Bank has experimented with and promoted customer-governed 
enterprises in a variety of forms.  Many of these efforts have involved rural cooperatives 
in agriculture, but there have been other interesting types as well.  One example is a “road 
fund” designed to improve the quality of construction and maintenance in road projects.  
                                                 
21Network Rail is less interesting than Glas Cymru because critics of Network Rail argue that it was not 
created to promote customer or community control but rather to maintain effective government control of 
the enterprise while keeping its debt off the government’s books. 
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fund managed by a board representing road users.  Road funds and road boards have been 
established in a number of countries, particularly in Africa (Gwilliam and Kumar, 2002). 
Advocates of consumer cooperatives and similar schemes claim that they offer 
advantages over both private investor-owned firms and SOEs.  Compared to investor-
owned firms, cooperatives and non-profits eliminate potential conflicts between 
shareholders and customers by eliminating shareholders.  Financing costs are often said 
to be reduced as well since cooperatives and non-profits replace private equity (which 
requires high rates of return) with member contributions and debt (which require lower 
rates of return).  Compared to SOEs, cooperatives promise to reduce principal-agent 
problems by shortening the link between customers and managers.  If the customers of an 
SOE want to influence management (through a route other than their purchasing 
decisions) they must first use their powers as voters and campaign contributors to 
influence elected politicians, who then must try to change the behavior of the bureaucrats 
who oversee the SOE and ultimately the SOE managers.  Cooperatives allow customer-
members to influence the managers directly, eliminating the politicians and bureaucrats 
as intermediaries. 
Skeptics argue that the influence of cooperative members over management is 
likely to be limited even if their route of control is more direct than in a SOE.   
Cooperative members still face obstacles to collective action:  the benefit to an individual 
member from improving firm performance is still typically small relative to the effort 
required to gather information and mobilize other members.  And since every member 
stands to benefit from reform, members still have an incentive to try to free ride on the 
efforts of others.  Many cooperative members view themselves more as customers than 
owners of the firm, which further discourages their participation in governance.  And low 
member participation increases the danger that the co-op will be captured by highly 
motivated special interests—such as major industrial customers, labor or management—
that might not have the general customer’s interests at heart. 
And while governance problems seem only slightly better in a cooperative than a 
SOE, they are much more difficult in a cooperative than in a firm with conventional 
shareholders.  Shareholders may be more motivated to exercise influence than 
  44cooperative members because they can easily sell their shares if the stock price rises.  
Moreover, cooperative members typically don’t receive a distribution of profits when 
they leave; mutual members can withdraw their deposits or cash in their life insurance 
policies but the amount they receive do not depend on the current condition of the firm.
22  
Equallyimportant, shareholding reduces the problem of free riding because an investor 
can buy up a large block of shares; cooperatives offer no similar method of concentrating 
the benefits of influencing management. 
Skeptics also argue that any nominal savings in the cost of capital for 
cooperatives or non-profits do not represent a real savings but a shifting of risks normally 
born by shareholders to the firm’s customer/members and/or taxpayers.  Glas Cymru and 
Network Rail are both financed entirely with debt, for example, and their debt receives a 
lower rate of return than the weighted average return on the debt and equity of the 
conventionally financed firms they replaced.  But the lack of equity limits the firms’ 
options if they get into financial trouble.  If their predecessor firms got into trouble, they 
could raise prices or cut the returns to equity before they would be forced to ask the 
government for a bailout or go bankrupt.  But the new firms, lacking equity, can only 
raise prices before they resort to a bailout or bankruptcy.  The new firms pay a higher 
interest rate on their debt than the old firms did, reflecting the added risk debt holders 
face without equity investors to help cushion shocks.  But the customers and the 
taxpayers also assume added risks for which they may not be adequately compensated.
23
Very few studies empirically compare the performance of cooperatives with other 
types of enterprises, and most of these focus on comparisons with private firms rather 
than with SOEs.
24  On the optimistic side, Vining and Boardman’s (1992, p. 226) study 
of the 500 largest non-financial Canadian firms found that the 16 cooperatives in the 
sample performed as well as their private counterparts and significantly better than the 
SOEs.  All 16 were producer cooperatives in the agricultural or general retailing areas.  
                                                 
22 There are often penalties and limitations on cashing out insurance policies, particularly for whole life 
contracts. 
23 The customers are compensated in that the expected prices for the firm’s services are lower, although 
more volatile.  The question then is whether the customer is prepared to assume the risk of price volatility 
or would prefer to have the stockholder assume it in return for a higher expected price.  For a fuller 
discussion see Gomez-Ibanez (2005a, pp. 7-9). 
24 There are a few theoretical comparisons of cooperative organizations and government departments of 
which the best by far is by Elinor Ostrum, Larry Schroeder and Susan Wynne (1993). 
  45On the pessimistic side, the scarcity of very large consumer cooperatives and the 
declining importance of mutuals in the savings and insurance business suggest that that 
the problems of collective action are serious for cooperatives with many members. 
More useful is the large body of case studies of cooperative enterprises that focus 
on the factors that contribute to success.  These studies suggest that the characteristics of 
the members, the specific services to be provided and the rules of governance for the 
enterprise are all important.  There is a strong consensus that cooperative enterprises are 
more successful if the membership is small, homogenous, stable, concentrated in location 
and bound by other social ties and institutions.  These characteristics make it easier to 
agree on policy, to detect free riding among members and to discourage shirking through 
informal social pressures.  Such characteristics are thought to be more common in rural 
than urban communities, which helps explain why so many cooperatives are rural. 
The characteristics of the service matter as well.  Perhaps most important is that 
there is a felt need for the service among potential members and that the service has 
reasonable prospects for commercial success.  Cooperatives which are founded at the 
instigation of government rather than the community or which provide money-losing 
services do not survive for long (Hussi et al., 1993).  Also important is whether the 
benefits each member receives from collective action are large, similar and can be easily 
monitored.  Elinor Ostrum and her colleagues argue, for example, that cooperatives to 
maintain rural irrigation systems are easier to sustain than cooperatives to maintain rural 
roads (Ostrum et al., 1993, pp. 106-107).  One reason is that it is harder to monitor and 
measure members’ use of a road than their use of an irrigation system, and thus put 
pressure on members to contribute their fair share.  The deterioration of the road surface 
is also very gradual, so that the benefits from maintenance are less immediate and 
obvious.  The silting of canals is gradual as well, but farmers at the tail end of the system 
feel the effects fairly quickly.  Moreover, a poor condition road typically does not 
threaten a farmer’s livelihood in the same way as a lack of water.  Particularly favorable, 
Ostrum argues, are irrigation systems where each farmer cultivates both head-end and 
tail-end plots so that the gain from collective action is obvious, similar and large for all. 
Finally, the rules by which customers participate in the governance of the 
enterprise matter as well.  For example, the water cooperative serving Santa Cruz divides 
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district.  The 27 members of the district boards then choose 9 among them to serve as the 
administrative board for the entire company (Ruiz-Mier and van Ginneken, 2006).   
Electing board members by district may lead to an excessive concern with district-level 
issues, but it is probably critical to maintain member interest and participation in such a 
large cooperative.  Similarly, a government-commissioned inquiry in Britain recently 
concluded that the rules of governance for mutual life insurance companies had to be 
improved in the wake of a scandal when one company unexpectedly and sharply reduced 
the value of its members’ policies.  The inquiry recommended that mutuals conform to 
codes of governance similar to those for listed companies, a change which would require 
more and better information disclosure to members, open and fair voting rules in the 
annual general meetings and more information and assistance for non-executive directors 
(Her Majesty’s Treasury, 1994). 
 
Prospects 
Changing the political economy of the public enterprise is an appealing approach 
since the root cause of poor SOE performance often seems to be the lack of political 
support for commercial behavior.  Many of the options for change seem to have potential 
if selectively applied, although few have been studied enough to be confident of their 
effects. 
Direct competition is arguably the best understood and most effective possibility 
because it solves the problem of collective action by customers and creates a new ally for 
reform.  Direct competition applies only to activities that don’t have elements of natural 
monopoly, however, which limits its use in infrastructure and utilities. 
Mixed-capital enterprises are also promising but may have a reasonable chance of 
success only in fairly sophisticated environments.  Selling debt or equity typically forces 
the firm to maintain better accounts and provide more information, but whether the 
private investors will effectively monitor and influence the SOEs behavior probably 
depends significantly on the circumstances.  Selling debt is probably less effective in 
motivating investors than selling equity, and selling equity should work best in countries 
with reasonable protections for minority investors. 
  47Cooperatives and other customer-governed enterprises may not perform as well as 
conventional private firms but they can be more efficient than SOEs if the problems of 
customer participation in the firm’s governance can be overcome.  These problems are 
thought more tractable the smaller and more homogenous the membership and the larger 
and more obvious the benefits from cooperative action.  The large British water and 
railroad companies limited by guarantee are too recent an innovation to know whether 
they will prove a success.  But the experience of the Santa Cruz water company and the 
mutual savings and insurance companies suggests that even large customer-governed 
enterprises can function reasonably well if the rules for membership participation are 
carefully thought out.  We need to learn more about how to design those rules. 
Finally, strategies that generate better information for customers and taxpayers are 
attractive in that they promise reform without a radical change in governance.  Such 
strategies have not been carefully studied, however, and we simply don’t understand well 
the circumstances under which better information alone will be sufficient to change SOE 
behavior.  The quality of the information is likely to be important, and in this regard 
special supervisory agencies, such as tariff regulators, hold some appeal.  Perhaps equally 
important is to identify situations where the obstacles to collective action are low, for 
example because of the presence of preexisting mobilized customer or taxpayer groups. 
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It should be no surprise that the efforts to reform SOEs in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s were disappointing.  Had SOE reform been reasonably successful, privatization 
would not have been embraced with such enthusiasm by the World Bank and other aid 
agencies in the 1990s.  And in the places where privatization eventually foundered it was 
due at least in part to many of the same conflicts over commercial and non-commercial 
goals and weak institutions that had plagued the earlier round of SOE reforms. 
Given the record, moreover, it is difficult to recommend specific SOE reform 
strategies with great confidence.  Many of the options have not been carefully studied, 
and what we know is not always promising.  Even at their theoretical best, few of the 
alternatives promise the same gains in commercial focus or performance as privatization.  
Moreover, some of the alternatives seem applicable only in fairly specialized situations.  
Even then, the reforms are often difficult to implement and even harder to sustain. 
Nevertheless, any effort at prescription should begin by dividing firms according 
to the degree of conflict between their commercial and non-commercial objectives and 
the level of development of their country’s market, administrative and political 
institutions.  Infrastructure enterprises often suffer from serious conflicts between 
commercial and social goals if only because access to infrastructure services is 
considered so important to modern life.  But in some firms this conflict may be less 
severe if, for example, tariffs have never been allowed to fall too far below costs, over-
staffing has never been too excessive or the potential technical efficiency gains are large 
enough to compensate customers or laid-off staff. 
Where the level of conflict over goals is low, the possibilities for SOE reform are 
much improved.  Low conflict allows one to rely on strategies that increase the firm’s 
human or physical capacity and clarify the responsibilities of ministers and managers 
instead of strategies that attempt the more difficult task of changing the underlying 
political economy of the firm.  And the more sophisticated the local administrative 
institutions, the more elaborate the effort to clarify responsibilities might be.  At a 
minimum one might corporatize the public enterprise to clarify the financial performance 
of the firm.  And where the public administration has the transaction skills and a tradition 
  49of following rules, one might establish an independent regulatory agency to set tariffs or 
tie management compensation to a formal performance contract. 
Where the level of conflict is high, the emphasis must shift to strategies that alter 
the political economy of the firm.  Unfortunately, some of these strategies apply only in 
special circumstances.  Direct competition only works only if there is no natural 
monopoly, for example, while mixed-capital enterprises depend on adequate legal 
protections for minority shareholders.  Others of these strategies seem less effective or 
well understood.  Information alone seems unlikely to have much effect where the level 
of conflict is high, for example, while large cooperatives are less studied and even small 
cooperatives work well only where the characteristics of the customers and services are 
conducive to effective collective governance. 
In firms where the conflict over goals is high but which are not good candidates 
for one of the strategies to change the firm’s political environment, the possibilities are 
more limited but not entirely hopeless.  At a minimum one might corporatize and provide 
some management training.  Corporatization is unlikely to insulate the enterprise from 
politics and encourage it to behave commercially, but improved accounting may be a first 
step to stimulate and inform a debate about the firm’s performance and goals.  Similarly, 
management training alone would not turn around the enterprise, but it might help 
modestly particularly if the training dealt more candidly and constructively with the 
political environment of the firm and was part of a well-thought-out personnel 
development program. 
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